THE NEW YORK TIMES’ David Brooks writes on risk assessment. Having done a fair number of risk assessments myself, I can agree that much of what Brooks writes is true. However, he does fail the Goofus Test:

“A consultation with Goofus MacDuff. He loves to be called in consultation and really gives it his all and invariably comes up with the wrong answer. The trick is to get his recommendation and then do precisely the opposite.... Every now and then the genius part comes out and Goofus touches every base until he comes to home plate, which he misses by an inch.”

Brooks’ “Goofus moment” is here:

There must be ways to improve the choice architecture — to help people guard against risk creep, false security, groupthink, the good-news bias and all the rest.

The problem is not that the systems are too complex (for a single person) to understand; it’s that the processes for mitigating the risk aren’t followed. By way of analogy, inspecting hard hats and steel-toed shoes is easy; inspecting the steel cables on a multi-ton capacity crane isn’t.

The problem is that the “safety nannies” esconsed within the regulatory authorities are so focused on the mundane, day-to-day risks (the trees) that they can’t (or won’t) see the catastrophic risks that make up the forest.